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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to explain one version of an empirical puzzle noted by Mankiw 
(2003): a Baumol-Tobin inventory-theoretic money demand equation predicts that the 
average U.S. adult should have held approximately $551.05 in currency and coin in 1995, 
while data show an average of $100. The models in this paper help explain this 
discrepancy using two assumptions: (1) the probabilities of being robbed or pick-
pocketed, or having a purse snatched, depend on the amount of cash held; and (2) there 
are costs of being robbed other than loss of cash, such as injury, medical bills, lost time at 
work, and trauma. Two models are presented: a dynamic, stochastic model with both 
instantaneous and decaying noncash costs of robbery, and a revised version of the 
inventory-theoretic model that includes one-period noncash costs. The former model 
yields an easily interpreted first-order condition for money demand involving various 
marginal costs and benefits of holding cash. The latter model gives quantitative solutions 
for money demand that come much closer to matching the 1995 data—$75.98 for one 
plausible set of parameters. This figure implies that consumers held approximately $96 
billion less cash in May 1995 than they would have in a world without crime. The 
modified Baumol-Tobin model predicts a large increase in household money demand in 
2005, mostly due to reduced crime rates. 
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“A man carrying a bag filled with nearly $150,000 in cash that he had just withdrawn 
from a bank in Midtown Manhattan was assaulted and robbed by an armed man on 
Friday afternoon, officials said. . . .One witness said the attacker repeatedly struck the 
man, and then dragged him several feet along the sidewalk in an apparent struggle over 
a black duffel bag that the police said was filled with cash. . . .Detectives are 
investigating whether the assailant knew that the man would be making a large 
withdrawal, or whether the attacker just happened to notice him taking out the money 
and moved in on him, the police said.” 
 





It is likely that this man had some reason for withdrawing such a large amount of money, 
but how rational are the rest of us? Few studies have been done on actual balances of 
currency. Porter and Judson (1996), citing a Federal Reserve survey of 500 households in 
1995, report that the average U.S. adult held $100 in cash ($136 in 2007 dollars). 
   A problem in N. Gregory Mankiw’s intermediate macroeconomics text points out 
that a Baumol-Tobin model of money demand suggests that this amount is much too 
small (Mankiw 2003, p. 449; Baumol 1952; Tobin 1956). The Baumol-Tobin model 
involves maximizing the following function, which gives the total costs of holding 
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where i is the nominal interest rate, representing the opportunity cost of holding cash, C 
is the amount of consumption paid for with cash, w is the nominal hourly wage or value 
of time, h is the amount of time (measured in hours) required for a trip to the bank or 
automatic teller machine (ATM), and f is the monetary cost of a withdrawal (such as an 
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  Using the May 1995 one-month CD rate of 5.98 percent, a measure of per capita 
nondurable consumption likely to be paid for with cash, the wage for private-sector 
production workers, a time cost for a trip to the bank of ten minutes, and an ATM fee of 
one dollar, the model gives a cash demand of $551.05
1 (See Appendix 2 for details about 
the data used in these calculations). And this model does not take into account the 
possible need for precautionary balances. What accounts for this discrepancy? 
  Another problem in Mankiw’s text looks at the possibility that the chance of loss 













where P is the probability that the agent’s cash will be lost or stolen. Data from the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (CVS), conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997), indicate that the incidence of completed 
robbery in 1995 was 3.5 per thousand persons age 12 or over.
2 The incidence of personal 
theft (meaning pick-pocketing or purse-snatching) was 1.9 per thousand. Adding these 
two figures gives P = .0035 + .0019 = .0054. Using this figure in the equation above 
gives a money demand of $527.73, still far above the Federal Reserve survey result. To 
take into account losses unrelated to crime, a larger P might be appropriate. Increasing P 
to .01 lowers the amount to $510.05—a figure that still strikes most people as far too 
high. 
  But it is not clear that P itself is independent of the amount of money a person 
holds. A common phrase on crime-prevention and tourist-advice websites is “Don’t flash 
                                                 
1 This figure is very high relative to weekly earnings. It may be doubtful that a worker without direct 
deposit would, on average, carry an amount of cash larger than his or her paycheck, since depositing the 
check in person requires a trip to the bank. Also, many people live “paycheck to paycheck.” For example, a 
full-time worker receiving the average wage used in this model for 1995 would have a gross biweekly 
paycheck of $926.40. If he or she always spends this entire amount, net of deductions, before the next 
check arrives, average cash balances could not be as described by this model. (The median and average 
U.S. residents have significant real wealth, however.)    
2 Robbery is a type of theft in which the robber directly confronts the victim and uses, or threatens to use, 
force, with or without a weapon. Pick-pocketing and purse-snatching do not involve the use of force, but in 
these crimes, the thief also steals items directly from a person, rather than from an unoccupied house, 
office, car, etc. See footnotes to Table 2 for sources.   4
your cash!” meaning, “Don’t openly handle large amounts of money!” Perhaps people 
carry less cash than theory predicts because potential thieves would be more likely to 
commit a crime if larger amounts of cash were at stake. Some empirical evidence for this 
idea exists (Porter and Judson 1996, p. 902; Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998, p. 
278; but see Jankowski, Porter, and Rice 2007). 
  This paper pursues a twofold explanation of low household demand for cash 
based on this idea. First, the probability of being robbed or being the victim of a purse-
snatcher or pick-pocket depends on the amount of money one holds—an endogenous 
probability of crime. Second, the costs of being robbed include not only the loss of the 
stolen money, but also what I will call “noncash” or nonpecuniary costs: psychological 
trauma, physical injury, lost time at work, medical bills, etc. I find that this model can go 
a long way toward explaining why individuals hold so much less money than theory 
would suggest. 
  The paper has five sections. Section 2 sketches some background facts about 
money holdings, theft, and robbery and reviews certain literature. Section 3 presents a 
dynamic money-in-the-utility-function model with nonpecuniary costs of robbery, some 
of which are incurred immediately and some of which decay over time. In this model, the 
probability of robbery is a function of the amount of money held. The first-order 
conditions for the solution of the model admit an easy interpretation involving various 
costs and benefits of holding cash. Section 4 augments the Baumol-Tobin model above 
with one-period nonpecuniary costs of robbery and endogenous probabilities of robbery, 
purse-snatching, and pick-pocketing. The latter model is used to arrive at quantitative 
solutions for money demand that better match the data mentioned above. Section 5 is a 
conclusion and discusses several implications of the results. 
 
2. SOME BACKGROUND FACTS AND LITERATURE ON CASH HOLDINGS, 
ROBBERY, AND PERSONAL THEFT 
 
As noted in the previous section, data on household cash (currency and coin) holdings are 
sparse. One would suspect since debit cards have become more widespread since 1995, 
cash holdings have fallen since then. Indeed, Humphrey (2004) estimates that 20 percent   5
of the dollar value of consumer transactions was accounted for by cash payments in 2000, 
down from 22 percent in 1995. While U.S. citizens may use less cash than they have in 
the past, there has been an influx of Latin American immigrants since the early 1980s, 
and there is some local evidence that these immigrants tend to use relatively large 
amounts of cash, especially $100 bills (Jankowski, Porter, and Rice 2007).
3 
  An alternative approach is to use aggregate data. Dividing the Federal Reserve’s 
estimate of currency outside financial institutions in September 2007 ($756.8 billion) by 
the U.S. population of approximately 301 million gives an average balance of $2,509.11, 
but a great deal of empirical evidence has been adduced that much, or perhaps most, of 
this amount is held overseas or in the underground economy (Porter and Judson 1996; 
Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998; Sprenkle 1993). For Icelandic currency, which is 
probably less commonly used than the dollar in foreign countries, the total stock divided 
by the population was the equivalent of $281 in 1996 (Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 
1998, p. 275). Lippi and Secchi (2004), using household survey data, estimate that the 
average Italian household held 376 euros, or about $332, in cash in 2002. The average 
ATM withdrawal in the United States was $99 in 2006, up from $85 in 2003 (Federal 
Reserve 2007).  
  As noted in the introduction, there is some scattered cross-country evidence of a 
negative effect of violent crime on household cash holdings (Porter and Judson 1996, p. 
902; Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998, p. 278). The incidence rates of robbery and 
theft of personal property were lower in 1991 in Italy than in the United States
4 
(International Crime Victims Survey 1997), which might suggest a partial explanation of 
Lippi and Secchi’s findings of higher cash balances in Italy.
5 
  A link between black market activity and currency demand equations is not new 
(Cagan 1958), but there have been few or no theoretical attempts to incorporate robbery 
and other forms of theft into models of money demand. None are mentioned in surveys of 
the field or standard references on money demand (Duca and VanHoose 2004; Laidler 
                                                 
3 The authors note several reasons for the use of cash by immigrants, including distrust of financial 
institutions, payment of wages in cash when workers are undocumented, and the use of cash for 
remittances. 
4 The incidence of robbery was 1.5 percent in the United States and 1.3 percent in Italy in 1991. According 
to the ICVS (1997), 5.3 percent of U.S. residents and 3.6 percent of residents of Italy had personal property 
stolen that year. 
5 Another might be the large numbers of small shops in Italy that do not accept credit or debit cards.   6
1977; Judd and Scadding 1982; Serletis 2001). The idea of an endogenous probability of 
stealing seems obvious and some of those who have mentioned a link between crime and 
money demand have this idea in mind, along with black market use of cash, which has 
the opposite effect (e.g., Jankowski, Porter, and Rice 2007, p. 18, footnote). Economists 
have studied the demand for goods that reduce the probability of crime for many years 
(e.g., Clotfelter 1977).   
  A few pieces of information from the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b) on robbery and other forms of theft seem relevant 
here. The national crime victimization survey reports that there were 624,850 robberies in 
the United States in 2005 (see Table 1). This amounts to a rate of 2.6 robberies per 1000 
people over 12. The rate for female victims was 1.4 per thousand; for male victims, 3.8 
per thousand. (These numbers were much higher, as discussed below, in 1995, the year of 
the Fed cash-balance study. See Table 2.) The 16-to-19 age group was the most 
vulnerable to robbery. The lower a person’s family income, the more likely they were to 
be robbed, with a remarkable .56 percent of those with family incomes of less than 
$7,500 falling victim to a robbery in 2005. There were 43,550 instances of purse-
snatching and 173,980 cases of pick-pocketing, for a total victimization rate of .9 per 
thousand people.  
  Of all robberies, 20.1 percent were committed by someone whom the victim 
knew. Female robbery victims were much more likely than males to have been robbed by 
someone they knew. Robbers used weapons in 51.3 percent of successful robberies and 
42.2 percent of unsuccessful robberies. 
  For robbery, the median property loss was $120 and the average was $791. The 
median loss for purse-snatching was $110 and for pick-pocketing the median loss was 
$62. The median losses for men and women and for whites and blacks were similar. The 
main property lost in robberies was cash or a purse, wallet, or credit cards in 55.3 percent 
of cases. The corresponding figure for pick-pocketing and purse-snatching was 87.8 
percent. When a person’s pocket was picked or purse stolen, the lost property was fully 
recovered only 6.7 percent of the time, while property was fully recovered after 14.7 
percent of robberies. After a robbery or attempted robbery, 10.2 percent of victims 
missed time from work. Victims sustained injuries in 33.2 percent of all robberies. The   7
percentage of male victims injured was slightly higher than the percentage of female 
victims injured. After 11.3 percent of robberies, victims incurred medical expenses.
  Of course, many additional data sources are available. A Swedish study found that 
robbery was a strong predictor of post-traumatic stress syndrome (Frans, Rimmö, Åberg, 
and Frederikson 2005). The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) found larger 
incidence rates for robbery (12 per thousand people aged 16 or above) and pick-
pocketing (8 per thousand) in their 2000 study, the last one for which published data are 
available (Van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000) (see Table 1). Like the 
national survey, it revealed higher rates for both crimes in 1995 than more recently (see 
Table 2). 
 
3. A DYNAMIC MONETARY MODEL WITH NONCASH COSTS AND AN 
ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY OF ROBBERY 
 
In one standard type of intertemporal monetary model, the demand for money is 
generated by assuming that higher real balances allow the consumer to spend less time 
traveling to the bank, increasing time available for work or leisure. I will use an 
equivalent formulation in the tradition of Sidrauski (1967), in which the consumer 
directly receives utility from real balances. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to measure 
the costs of being robbed. These can include the psychological impact, the effects of any 
injuries during the robbery, and so on. Moreover, these effects carry over into future 
periods by contributing to a state variable that might be called “the stock of trauma.” The 
model contains only two financial assets, bonds and currency, but could easily be 
extended to include others, including checking accounts.  
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where 0<β<1 is the discount factor; Mt is nominal holdings in period t of currency; Ct is 
the amount of the consumption good consumed; Pt is the period t price level of that good;   8
0 < P(Mt/Pt-1) < 1 is the probability of being robbed, conditional on the amount of real 
balances, Mt/Pt-1; and Rt is the amount of “trauma” from past robberies. This model does 
not include forms of theft other than robbery, which probably cause less trauma and 
injury. I will assume that real balances are bounded above. The functions u, w, and g are 
twice continuously differentiable, with 
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  The function u is strictly concave and bounded above and is a standard utility 
function of the type used in Sidrauski models; w is the nonpecuniary disutility of being 
robbed, which is assumed to depend on the amount of cash lost; and g is the impact of 
past robberies on utility, due to trauma, injury, and so on. The functions u, w, and g are 
specified so that the expression in (1) is always nonnegative. 
  The constraint and law of motion for the problem depend upon whether the 
consumer is robbed of his or her cash balances. When the consumer is robbed of his or 
her cash, his or her financial constraint is 
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where At is financial assets in period t, r is the real interest rate, Bt is the number of bonds 
(with assets and bonds denominated in units of the consumption good), and y is the 
consumer’s endowment, which is the same in each period. The consumer receives interest 
on the amount of the previous period that he or she invested in bonds (i.e., did not 
consume or change into cash).  
  Since I will not be focusing on intertemporal consumption decisions, I will 
assume for simplicity that  
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  When the consumer is not robbed and thus retains his or her cash balances from 
the previous period, which nonetheless may be eroded by inflation   9
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  Assets are allowed to become negative, but must remain greater than or equal to 
some lower bound B, meaning that the consumer can borrow by “issuing bonds,” but has 
a credit limit.  
  The law of motion of the stock of trauma from robbery is  
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if the consumer is robbed, where  
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if the consumer is not robbed. Trauma fades away with time, but increases any time a 
robbery occurs. 
  I will use the exogenous shock variable Zt to indicate whether the consumer was 
robbed in period t, which will take on the value 1 if a robbery has taken place and zero if 
not. The set 
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is the history of this exogenous state variable, which takes on the value 1 with the 
probability P each period. The consumer’s problem is to maximize (1), subject to (2), (3), 
(4), and (5).  
  Specifically, the consumer’s problem is to choose a plan   10
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where Πt is a vector-valued function mapping the state variables onto the real plane 
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  Of course, I will restrict my attention to plans that are feasible, meaning that they 
obey the constraints (2) and (3), given the history of victimizations Z
t. 
  The Bellman equation for the problem is 
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and the supremum is over sequences that obey a no-Ponzi condition, the credit limit, 
nonnegativity constraints on Mt and Ct, and the upper bound on Mt/Pt-1. By Blackwell’s 
sufficient conditions (Stokey and Lucas 1989, p. 54), the right hand side of equation (6) is 
a contraction in the space of bounded, nonnegative, continuous functions V on pairs of 
nonnegative numbers with the sup norm. Hence it has a solution V in that space. 
  Moreover, V is strictly concave and continuously differentiable. The supreme 
value function satisfies (6) (see Appendix 1 for details).  
  The Bellman equation (6) is sufficient to ensure that V is equal to the supreme 
value function, and all plans generated Пt*(Z
t-1) by the Bellman function as follows  
   11
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achieve the supremum (see appendix for details).  
  Because of the continuity of the expression inside the brackets and the 
compactness of the action space, we can be sure that there is such a plan. By strict 
concavity, that plan is unique. 
  The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior maximum for 
the problem on the right-hand side of (6) are 
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where numerical subscripts on functions indicate partial differentiation by the relevant 
variable, Πt=Pt/Pt-1, and, for compactness of notation, the function pw’ is used to denote 
the partial derivative of P(Mt/Pt-1)w(Mt/Pt-1) with respect to real balances. 
  The envelope theorem implies that the following holds in the interior of the 
choice set 
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  The Euler and money demand equations are 
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where (Mt+1/Pt)’ and Ct+1’ are next period’s real balances and consumption in the event 
that I am robbed in this period, and the corresponding variables with double-prime marks 
are those planned in the event of no robbery. Equation 11 can be found by combining (8) 
and (10), and (12) can be derived from (9) and (10).  
  The Euler equation (11) is standard in problems of this type. Condition (12) 
shows that the consumer chooses monetary balances by weighing the following marginal 
benefits and costs of holding an additional unit of cash:  
 
  (1) the first term is the standard marginal utility benefit due to a reduction in  
      “shoe-leather costs,” etc.;  
  (2) the second term is the joint effect of higher balances on both the probability of 
       being robbed and the severity of the nonpecuniary effects of being robbed;  
  (3) the next term, involving the difference between the values of V in the cases of   
       robbery and no robbery, shows the marginal impact of a higher probability of       
       being robbed on the expected stocks of assets, At+1 and trauma, Rt+1 and hence      
       on future utility (note that this term is negative because the value function is    
       strictly increasing in assets and strictly decreasing in the stock of trauma); and  
  (4) the last two terms represent the marginal utility costs due to foregone  
       consumption in period t+1 (at a given probability of robbery). First, in the case  
       of robbery with probability P, the consumer loses the gross return (1+r) that he  
       or she would have earned by storing a marginal unit of wealth in bonds;  
       second, if no robbery occurs, an event with probability (1-P), the consumer  
       still loses the gross bond return, but retains the money, which is scaled down  
       by inflation to obtain new real balances. 
 
  Hence, there are four reasons in this model why the possibility of being robbed 
reduces the net marginal benefits of holding real balances. First, any case of robbery 
reduces psychological and/or physical well-being. This is due to (a) the impact on 
current-period utility, through the function w and (b) the impact on future utility, through 
the function g. The expected value of both of these costs is increased when more money 
is held, because the consumer is more likely to be robbed when he or she is holding more   13
real balances and because robbery creates more immediate disutility when more money is 
lost. Second, the consumer also loses utility when he or she is robbed because of a loss of 
cash to the robber. This loss (c) has a higher probability and (d) is larger, when more real 
balances are held. 
 
4. HOW MUCH DOES CRIME AVOIDANCE EXPLAIN? QUANTIFYING THE 
EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS ROBBERY, PICK-POCKETING, AND PURSE-
SNATCHING PROBABILITIES ON MONEY DEMAND 
 
As we saw in the introduction, common sense and the data suggest that people hold very 
little cash—an average of $100 in 1995 (Porter and Judson 1996). However, I showed 
that a simple Baumol-Tobin money demand model, which takes into account the 
financial and time costs of bank transactions, as well as foregone interest due to cash 
holdings, indicates that each adult should have held approximately $551.05. Mankiw, in 
his textbook, clearly indicates that the possibility of robbery, theft, or loss could account 
for part of the puzzle. He clearly believes that these factors are not sufficient to explain 
the puzzle. In this section, I add the psychological, physical, and other noncash costs of 
robbery. The use of an endogenous probability of robbery will increase the impact on 
money demand of expected cash loss due to robbery and make the noncash impact of 
robbery relevant for a calculation of money demand.  
  The modified Baumol-Tobin model uses the following objective function 
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  The consumer’s problem is to maximize this function with respect to the variable 
M, which represents average nominal currency holdings (the price level is normalized to 
one). The first two terms are identical to the Baumol-Tobin objective function in the 
introduction. The third term is the expected amount of money lost to criminals, which 
equals the average amount of money held, M, times the probability P1(M) of losing 
money to robbery, pick-pocketing, or purse-snatching, conditional on the amount of 
money held. The fourth term is the expected loss above and beyond the amount of cash   14
on hand, which is equal to the conditional probability P2(M) of an attempted or 
completed robbery, times the noncash costs of robbery, s.
6  
  Maximizing (13) with respect to M gives the following money-demand first-order 
condition 
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  This equation requires a specification of the conditional probability of loss 
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where the Greek letters are parameters.
7 These equations give the parameterized demand 
equation 
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after differentiating (15) and (16) and substituting them into (14). I explain in Appendix 2 







                                                 
6 I ignore burglary and other forms of theft other than robbery, pick-pocketing, and purse-snatching.  
7 This function is convex when the probability P is less than .5. For reasonable values of the parameters, 
there are no equilibria in the concave part of the function.   15
  I use two logit equations to solve for λ and θ   
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which are obtained after plugging M’ and M’’ (two different values for M) into (15). For 
M’, I use Porter and Judson’s figure of $100 for average cash holdings in May of 1995. 
For P1(M’), I use the incidence of completed robbery plus the probability of personal 
theft (pick-pocketing or purse-snatching) for 1995 from the National Crime Victimization 
Survey, for a total of .0054 (U.S. Department of Justice 1997).
8 (See Table 2 for 1995 
crime rate estimates.) 
  M” and P1(M”) are counterfactual data points, so I have no data. I will simply 
explore the implications of certain plausible figures. So, suppose that increasing money 
holdings to M” =  $1,000 (a tenfold increase) would raise the probability of completed 
robbery or personal theft to P1(M”) = .00594, which is a ten-percent increase. This 
implies an elasticity
9 of theft to money holdings of approximately .0111. Solving 
equations (17) with these numbers gives λ = 0.000106504 and θ = -5.22659 (Later I 
report the implications of other values for the elasticity).  
 For  γ and ω, I use a similar calculation. For P2(M’), I use the probability of 
robbery (completed or not completed) from the same survey. M’ is again $100. M” and 
P2(M”) are once again calculated with an assumed elasticity of .0111. For 1995, the 
probabilities happen to be the same as in the previous calculation, which means that λ = γ 
and θ = ω. 
  I also calculate λ, θ, γ, and ω in other ways. For use in my solution of the model 
for 2004–05, I inflate M’ and M” by the increase in the CPI for all urban consumers 
                                                 
8 The CVS figure for pick-pocketing and purse-snatching includes some unsuccessful attempts to steal 
purses, resulting in a slight overestimate. 
9 Of course, this number is not truly an elasticity because it is not local. The properties of the function differ 
for smaller changes in money holdings.   16
before solving equations (17) and the equivalent equations for γ and ω. I also calculate 
the corresponding four parameters for 1995 ICVS data. 
  The costs of victimization are inherently difficult to measure.
10 I explore two 
possible values for s, the costs of robbery. First, Cohen et al. (2004) used the contingent 
valuation (willingness-to-pay) method to find the value of a statistical armed robbery of 
some person in a survey respondent’s community.
11 They do not provide a figure for 
robberies in general. Since this is a cost for a statistical armed robbery of some 
community member, it is surely a lower bound for the cost of a statistical armed robbery 
to the respondent him or herself. I would surely pay at least as much to prevent a 
statistical robbery of myself as to stop a statistical robbery of a random member of my 
community. Cohen et al. (2004) find this cost to be $232,000 in year 2000 dollars 
($279,346 in 2007 dollars) for a sample of 798 U.S. respondents.
12  
  As a second value for s, I use a figure from Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996), 
as reported by Cohen (2001, Table 1.1). They construct values from actual damages 
awarded to crime victims in suits against third parties (for example, the owner of a poorly 
lit parking lot where an assault took place). They include costs that are imposed on 
society at large (such as police services) and property loss, which I am counting 
separately, so I add only the remaining components of the damages they report for actual 
or attempted robbery: productivity ($950) and quality of life ($5,700), for a total of 
$6,650 (or about $9,542 in 2007 dollars). (Conservatively, I assume medical and mental 
health care are paid for by other parties.) These figures do not include punitive damages.  
                                                 
10 The use of a monetary cost here is not to make an accounting of the worth of crime reduction to society. 
In this paper, s is used as a measure of willingness to pay to avoid a crime, without any normative 
implication that a victim would be fairly compensated by a payment of that amount. Some may feel that the 
costs of robbery are large but reject the notion that they should adjust their behavior in fear. All of these 
issues are beyond the scope of a model such as the one in this paper. 
11 The term statistical robbery implies a marginal reduction in the probability of robbery. So, as a 
hypothetical example, a value of $232,000 for a statistical robbery does not imply that subjects would be 
willing (or able) to pay $232,000 for a police car that would prevent a sure robbery in their communities, 
but they would be willing to contribute $2.32 toward buying a police car that would reduce the probability 
of robbery from .0054 to .00539. Cohen et al. (2004, p. 94) actually asked subjects about measures that 
“successfully prevent[] one in ten armed robberies in your community.”  
12 Both figures for the nonpecuniary costs of robbery are adjusted to the relevant years using the CPI for all 
urban consumers. See Appendix 2 for details. Use of the $232,000 figure results in some double-counting, 
as it presumably includes cash losses, which are accounted for separately in the model. However, the 
average cash losses incurred in a robbery are obviously only a small fraction of this amount, so double-
counting does not affect estimated money demand very much.   17
  With these parameters in hand, I numerically solved (14’).
13 The results are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4 for a number of different sets of parameters, together with the 
results reported earlier for the model without robbery and other forms of theft. Table 3 
shows estimates based on crime rates from the CVS and Table 4 reports estimates derived 
from ICVS data. 
  The last row of each table repeats the result reported in Section 1 for a Baumol-
Tobin model with no crime. As for the rest of the tables, the first column of each table 
gives three different noncash costs of robbery: zero; Cohen’s (2001) tort-based estimate 
of $6,650 in 1993 dollars; and the contingent valuation estimate in Cohen et al. (2004), 
which was $232,000 in 2000 dollars. The second column of the table is for the situation 
described earlier, in which carrying $1,000 instead of $100 raises the probability of 
robbery or other theft by 10 percent. The third and fourth columns are for sets of 
parameters derived under the assumptions that increasing cash holdings from $100 to 
$500 or $200 raises the probability of crimes by 10 percent, resulting in elasticities of 
.025 or .1.
14  
  The tables show that the model goes a long way toward solving the problem 
posed by Mankiw in his textbook. The top row of results, for a zero nonpecuniary cost of 
robbery, shows that an endogenous probability of robbery makes little difference if the 
representative agent is concerned only about losing his or her cash. The next two rows 
show much larger reductions in money demand. The estimates based on Cohen et al. 
(2004) seem most relevant, because they are estimates of willingness to pay to avoid a 
crime, rather than damage awards in lawsuits against defendants who did not actually 
commit the crime. Using figures from Cohen et al. for the noncash costs of robbery, 
Table 3 shows cash demands ranging from $312.90 for a relatively low elasticity of crime 
to cash balances and $231.79 for a higher elasticity, to $125.78 for the highest elasticity 
considered.
15 Using the higher crime rates reported in the ICVS, one finds a cash demand 
                                                 
13 I used the FindRoot function in Mathematica. 
14 The $500 and $1000 figures were arbitrarily chosen “for the sake of argument” to represent very 
conservative assumptions about the effect of money holdings on crime. Later, an assumption of $200 was 
added on the grounds that the original assumptions generated excessive money demands. No attempt was 
made to adjust the parameters to fit the data exactly. 
15 Evaluating the logit equations (16 and 17) for crime probabilities at the money demand levels reported 
below give probabilities that are close to their observed levels. Thus, the conditional expectations in the 
model are fairly consistent with the behavior generated by the model.   18
of $203.81 with a low elasticity, $143.94 when using a medium elasticity, and $75.98 for 
a high elasticity. If it is true that the value found by Cohen et al. (2004) is only a lower 
bound, with actual noncash costs of robbery being much higher, then these numbers 
would be overestimates. Moreover, this figure is for armed robbery. On the other hand, 
Cohen’s (2001) lawsuit-based cost estimates give much weaker results: $509.58, 
$487.86, and $393.57 for various elasticities and CVS crime rate data with corresponding 
figures of $427.95, $392.72, and $284.30 for ICVS data. All of these figures compare 
with the Fed’s empirical estimate of $100 and a benchmark Baumol-Tobin demand of 
$551.05.  
  How much difference do these estimates make for aggregate cash demand? 
Multiplying the solution with the best fit [for a high elasticity, ICVS data, and noncash 
costs of robbery from Cohen et al. (2004)] by the population over age 15 gives $15.09 
billion, as opposed to $111.05 billion for a model without crime and Federal Reserve 
aggregate currency of $367.9 billion.
16 Hence, according to the model, the fear of crime 
reduced cash demand by 86 percent, or $96.0 billion. This impact is equivalent to 26.1 
percent of total currency as measured by the Federal Reserve. Using Porter and Judson’s  
(1996, p. 895) point estimate that 55 percent of all currency is held abroad, eliminating 
the fear of crime would increase household cash demand by an amount equivalent to 47.5 
percent of domestically held currency. The model does not account for hoards, money 
held by businesses, or precautionary balances, all of which, along with black market 
demand and foreign holdings, may contribute to the underestimate of domestic currency. 
  Since I have no recent data on cash holdings, it is not possible to determine if the 
model performs well when the lower crime rates of today are used to calibrate the model. 
Still, I will report some predictions of the model to offer a sense of its implications for 
more recent behavior. I calibrate the model with data similar to those used in my 1995 
calculations. However, ICVS data, which seemed to provide the parameters that allowed 
the best fit, are not available for the United States after 1999. I use 2004–05 CVS data.  
  The results, shown in Table 5, are somewhat disappointing, mostly suggesting 
implausibly large cash demands, even with a high elasticity of crime to money balances. 
The highest-elasticity results are $865.00 with low noncash costs of crime and $283.91 
                                                 
16 The Fed figure is seasonally unadjusted and does not include cash held by financial institutions or coins.   19
with high costs. The equivalent figures for the lowest elasticity considered are $1,287.90 
and $750.05. One might suspect that these demands are large because of the dramatic fall 
in crime that occurred in the late 1990s, which probably reduces the ability of the 
endogenous crime probabilities to explain low balances. The largest difference between 
the 1995 and 2004–05 money demands is across all estimates, including the benchmark 
Baumol-Tobin model with no crime. The explanation partly lies in much larger average 
nominal nondurable consumption expenditures in 2005 than in 1995—$18,535 versus 
$12,378―a 38 percent increase in the nominal wage, a more than doubling of the interest 
rate, and a larger real ATM fee. To determine the effects of reduced crime rates, one can 
use the 1995 logit parameters for the conditional probability of crime in the 2004–05 
computation. As an example, if the Cohen et al. (2004) noncash costs of crime and an 
elasticity of .0111 are used in the 2004–05 computation (with the 1995 logit parameters 
replacing the more recent ones), money demand drops from $750.05 to $516.48. This 
represents a 31 percent decrease or 53.4 percent of the total difference in predicted 
money demand between the two years. If the model describes behavior well, and cash 




The models presented in this paper offer what I hope is an intuitively appealing answer to 
the anomaly that Mankiw pointed out in his textbook. The purpose of the paper is not to 
claim that a simple model such as the second one in this paper can very closely track 
actual money demand, only to show that it is not hard to generate large enough effects of 
endogenous crime to offset apparent incentives for counterfactual behavior. Aside from 
providing an explanation to what appears to be a blatant contradiction of theory, the 
endogenous crime theory of cash demand may help answer some broader questions. First, 
the portion of the aggregate stock of cash, as measured by the Federal Reserve, that is not 
held by U.S. households must be held by someone. Knowing the amount of cash held by 
U.S. households can help answer questions regarding other types of cash demand, such as 
cash held abroad and in the black market. Knowledge of the approximate cash holdings 
of these “dollar economies” allows estimates to be made of their size. A satisfying   20
theoretical explanation may add weight to the evidence provided by the existing 
household survey data, which contradict estimates obtained in other ways (Flow-of-
Funds data, etc.). Since household survey data do not exist for recent years, the estimates 
for 2004–05 presented in this paper may provide a clue to underground and foreign 
demand in the absence of direct empirical evidence on household demand. 
  The calculations here also provide evidence for certain welfare issues. If the best 
estimate of cash demand for 1995 ($75.98) is considered, U.S. residents spent over 2.35 
billion extra hours going to the bank in 1995 because of fear of crime. Using the average 
wage for production workers, the value of this time was over $27.3 billion, or $37.2 
billion in 2007 dollars—a cost of crime that has probably not been sufficiently 
recognized. Of course, these numbers are inevitably dependent on certain approximations 
and assumptions that merely seem reasonable, so they should not be taken too seriously 
as estimates. But they do give a sense of the large costs that might be involved. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
This appendix shows how the Bellman equation 
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can be reformulated so that one can show: 
  
(1) the supreme value function V*, which gives the sup of all expected utilities 
attainable by following feasible plans, equals the unique function that satisfies the 
Bellman equation, and any plan generated by the Bellman function attains the 
supremum given by V*; and 
(2) all plans that attain the supremum are generated by the Bellman function. 
 
  These claims correspond roughly with theorems 9.2 and 9.3 of Stokey and Lucas 
(1989), except that here we specialize to finite state space and a bounded value function. 
More importantly, our claims involve a Bellman equation with expectations that are 
conditional on an endogenous choice variable. The purpose of this appendix is to 
transform the problem so that it uses unconditional expectations, rather than conditional 
ones, making it clear that the reasoning of Stokey and Lucas’s theorems apply. 
  The new Bellman equation requires some new notation. Let Yt be a random 
variable that is uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0,1]. Let h(Yt,Mt/Pt-1) be a 
function defined as follows  
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otherwise. 
 
Using this notation, the Bellman equation is 
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  Using this form of the Bellman equation, one can prove the first claim at the 
beginning of this section using the same steps as in theorem 9.2 of Stokey and Lucas 
(1989, pp. 246–248). A proof of the second claim follows the same reasoning as theorem 
9.3 (pp. 251–253).   23
APPENDIX 2 
 
Consumption is expenditures on nondurable goods and certain services (transportation, 
recreation, and “other”) for the second quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 2005 from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts, divided by the 
estimated population 16 years and older from the Bureau of the Census for July 1, 1995 
and July 1, 2005. The wage is the average hourly earnings of production workers in the 
private sector from the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics from May 
of 1995 and January of 2005. The price index is the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers, with annual figures for 1993 and 2000 used for the estimates of Cohen 
(2001) and Cohen et al. (2004), respectively, and indices for May 1995 and January 2005 
used for the 1995 and 2005 estimates of money demand. The estimated probabilities of 
theft and robbery from the CVS are explained in the text and are from Table 1, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (1997) and Table 2, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006a). Estimated 
probabilities of crime from the ICVS are from Tables 2 and 6 of Van Kesteren, Mayhew, 
and Nieuwbeerta (2000). See footnotes to Tables 3, 4, and 5 for details on the crime 
statistics used. Average fees for a withdrawal, f, for 2005 are taken from Bankrate.com 
(McBride 2005) and equal a foreign ATM fee of $1.35, plus an ATM surcharge 
averaging $1.40 at 91 percent of ATMs, for a total of $2.62. (f = 1.35 + .91*1.40 = 2.62). 
No data were available on ATM fees for 1995, but fees have been rising (McBride 2005), 
so a figure of $1 was assumed. The interest rate is the one-month CD rate reported by the 
Federal Reserve. 
   24
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Table 1. Incidence of Crimes in the United States, Most Recent Published Data 
 








Snatching   .9    8 
Attempted Robbery   .8   




Table 2. Incidence of Crimes in the United States, 1995 
 







Snatching  1.9    9 
Attempted Robbery  1.9  
Robbery  3.5 16 
                                                 
17 Incidence rates in this column are number of incidents in the year divided by the population aged 12 and 
over times 1000. Figures from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006a, Table 2). Data from two different 
years were combined because of small sample size. 
18 Incidence rates in this column are number of incidents in the year divided by the population aged 16 and 
over times 1000. Robbery statistics are from Table 2 (Van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000). 
Pickpocketing and purse-snatching are listed as simply “pick-pocketing” in Table 6 (Van Kesteren, 
Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000). 
19 Incidence rates in this column are number of incidents in the year divided by the population aged 12 and 
over times 1000. Taken from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (1997, Table 1). 
20 Incidence rates in this column are number of incidents in the year divided by the population aged 16 and 
over times 1000. Robbery statistics are from Table 2 (Van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000). 
Pickpocketing and purse-snatching are listed as simply “pick-pocketing” in Table 6 (Van Kesteren, 
Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000).    28
 
Table 3. 1995 Cash Demand in Baumol-Tobin Model with Endogenous Probabilities 
of Crimes and Crime Incidence Data from the U.S Department of Justice 
 
  Elasticity of Crime to Cash Balances 
Costs of Robbery 
Other than Loss of 
Cash 
.0111  .0250  .1000 
0  525.47 522.49  503.83 
Cohen (2001)  509.58 487.86  393.57 
Cohen et al. (2004)  312.90 231.79  125.78 




Table 4. 1995 Cash Demand in Baumol-Tobin Model with Endogenous Probabilities 
Of Crimes and Crime Incidence Data from the International Crime Victims Survey 
 
  Elasticity of Crime to Cash Balances 
Costs of Robbery 
Other than Loss of 
Cash 
.0111  .0250  .1000 
0  456.80 449.48  412.74 
Cohen (2001)  427.95 392.72  284.30 
Cohen et al. (2004)  203.81  143.94    75.98 




Table 5. Cash Demand in Baumol-Tobin Model with Endogenous Probabilities 




  Elasticity of Crime to Cash Balances 
Costs of Robbery 
Other than Loss of 
Cash 
.0111  .0250  .1000 
0  1337.02 1314.58  1163.36 
Cohen (2001)  1287.90  1206.18    865.00 
Cohen et al. (2004)    750.05    542.26    283.91 
No Crime  1417.95 1417.95  1417.95 
 
 
 